constitutional law essay

The Exclusionary Rule Evaluation Law Constitutional Administrative Essay

Exclusionary Rule Evaluation

By: Brandon J. Graham

University of Phoenix

Exclusionary Rule Evaluation

Everyday ordinary citizens do realize that they have a right to privacy in today’s world. They also believe that they are not subject to search and seizure unless a warrant been issued by the courts. However, some ordinary citizen are not aware that an exclusionary rule that protects and enforces this right under the law. The exclusionary rule clearly states "any evidence illegally obtained or seized by any local, state and or federal government officials cannot be introduced by the prosecution in a criminal case to determine the defendant guilt". The main reason behind the exclusionary rule is to ensure that law enforcement officials are not violating any individual Fourth Amendment rights. Officers are aware that in violating any part of this law can cause the court to quash the evidence and thrown it out as if it was never existed. When people think about abolishing the exclusionary rule, it is particularly noteworthy that everyone should take a good look and examine the law and it procedures of the law. It is also beneficial to examine the exceptions, cost, benefits and legal remedies if the exclusionary rule stays or abolished by the people.

For the exclusionary rule to be applied in any case there must be at least three findings present as noted within the law. The first part is that any law enforcement officer, or an agent that works for a law enforcement agency, must have taken criminal action. The second part is that the law enforcement officer or its agent must obtained evidence, in question. The third part is that a there must be a clear connection between the evidence and criminal activity. However, there are some exceptions to the exclusionary rule, which known as the "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" Doctrine. Under this doctrine, which has three parts to it, are the inevitable discovery rule, attenuation relationship necessary qualifications, and the good faith exception. These exceptions occur whenever the "situation meets the three elements required for the exclusionary rule to apply, but the evidence allowable regardless".

The first part of the doctrine occurs when evidence in the case been illegally obtained by law enforcement officials; however, it possible that the evidences in question found in a legitimate area and was not illegally connected by the search. This means that any evidence that obtained from any other person, but law enforcement considered being evidence in the case as it found by a third party. The Supreme Court decided that this exception does allow this exception and did not violate Fourth Amendment rights. This issue brought up for debate during the case of Segura v. United States back in 1984, when law enforcement officers illegally gained access to Segura’s house where there was incriminating evidence that was in clear sight. The officers were eventually able to obtain a warrant based on the information they obtained before illegally entering the house. However, the United States Supreme Court ruled that any evidence obtained during the search in the case allowed because it obtained independent by a third party that was not a law enforcement officer during the illegal entry.

Evidence is admissible in a case, where the inevitable discovery rule applies, when the evidence obtained illegally by a third party or independent person. This exception has brought up for debate in court. Back in 1977 in the case of Brewer vs. Williams, the court ruled that when the police discovered a female body, the court considered that it was not admissible in court because its finding based on an interrogation that considered unconstitutional. However, the case brought back into court in 1984 after several debates of this case and another case called Nix vs. William. The court ruled that ruled that the confession of Mr. William was inadmissible. However, it decided that the location of the body was permissible because the body could be discovered during a two and a half miles radius search done by a search party. This means that the search party would have certainly found the body regardless of the information that obtained during a confession because its location was in the area the search party instructed to search.

However, under the attenuation relationship part of the law, states that any "evidence derived from an illegal, or unconstitutional source is permissible when, for some reason, the link between the primary illegality and the evidence sought to be introduced has become so weak or vague that the "fruits" have become "untainted"". For example in the case of Wong Sun vs. United States, various narcotics officers had illegally entered an apartment, in hopes that there are some drugs inside the residences after obtaining during questioning. However, during the search it found that there were no drugs in the apartment. The Supreme Court decided that evidence obtained during the questioning was inadmissible because it was the tainted. Mr. Wong Sun released from police custody. Several days later Mr. Sun had given officers an incriminating statement since this statement was voluntary it deemed acceptable by the Supreme Court, due to it connection to his prior arrest; which makes it difficult to keep the questioning dissipate as tainted.

However, when it comes to the good faith part of the law, it clearly states that any "evidence obtained by law enforcement officers could become acceptable based on a search warrant even if the search warrant later deemed invalid" This ruled added as an exception rule due to the case of United States v. Leon. The court ruled that the main purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "impede law enforcement officials from violating a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, and under the good faith exception there is no wrongdoing from law enforcement". Therefore, any evidence obtained during the search warrant is admissible in court and under the law.

When it comes down to understanding the costs and benefits of the exclusionary rule, any person must decide whether or not to discontinue its use under the law. However, one reason to support this is because of its deterrent effect. The rule adopted because it was belief that the primary reason behind the exclusionary rule is the assertion in suppression of illegally seized evidence, which will prevent police officers from conducting illegal searches of individuals and their effects. Another advantage is its educative effect.

When it comes to the value in keeping the exclusionary rule seen some researchers had concluded that the rule can be removed from the law, due to the exceptionally low percentages of cases affected by this rule. This means that police officers and law enforcement officers are adhering to the rules, when it comes to search and seizures. However, some people would like to keep in the rule in place to help deterred the police from misusing it powers.

There are three types’ remedies under the exclusionary rule. These remedies known to be reparation, disgorgement, and deterring future wrongdoing. Reparation in place to help the disabled individual to the position he or she was at before the injury". Disgorgement in place to "raise the criminal in a level that is no better than the position he or she had before committing the unlawful act". The third remedy is to "deterring future wrongdoing aims to strengthen the public by placing the public in a better condition than it would be in if deterrence not undertaken". The Supreme Court has used these three theories of remedies to support the use of the exclusionary rule.

It’s determined that the overall rational and purpose of the exclusionary rule is good to have on the books. It been determined that the use of exceptions to rule, the costs and benefits of the rule, and alternative remedies is good to help ensure that law enforcement officers are doing their job in today’s society. Even, with some people that want to destroy the exclusionary rule that put in place by the United States Supreme Court, this effort to abolished it should not occurred under any circumstances. Its determined that this rule created outside of the United States Constitution because the court saw that this ruled could be beneficial to all parties and needed at the time, and the ruling placed into law.

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How a Bill Becomes a Law: The Constitutional Way

In order to ensure the vitality of the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers, the Framers gave the President what Madison in Federalist No. 47 called a “partial agency” in the legislative process. The President can propose measures to Congress (Article II, Section 7, Clause 2) and either approve or veto bills passed by Congress. It is worth noting that the executive veto is not a fiat—the President must return the vetoed bill to Congress “with his Objections” so that Congress may reconsider the bill in light of these objections. The Presentment Clause serves not only to delineate the President’s role in the legislative process; its detailed stipulations also make clear that Congress may not bypass them, for example, by delegating its legislative powers to administrative agencies (see Constitutional Guidance for Lawmakers No. 1 on Article I, Section 1: “Legislative Powers: Not Yours to Give Away ”). The Constitution insists that laws must be approved by both houses and the President. Administrative regulations circumvent both. This essay is adapted from The Heritage Guide to the Constitution for a new series providing constitutional guidance for lawmakers.

“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”

— Article I, Section 7, Clause 2

The Presentment Clause is commonly viewed as a provision that protects the President’s veto power, an association reinforced by the clause’s name. Yet, the Presentment Clause has a broader function: The clause prescribes the exclusive method for passing federal statutes, indicating that all bills must pass both Houses of Congress and be subject to the President’s veto. Thus, with some justification, one might call the provision the Lawmaking Clause.

The Presentment or Lawmaking Clause was often debated during the Founding, but the discussions generally focused on issues not relevant to current interpretive controversies. In the Constitutional Convention, the principal focus was on how difficult it should be for Congress to override the President’s veto and on whether the President should possess the veto alone or should share it with the judiciary in a council of revision. During the ratification debates, the Federalists sought to justify the veto and bicameralism as devices for restraining the legislature from invading executive power and for limiting the enactment of hasty and unwise legislation.

The Presentment Clause ultimately drafted by the Convention was one of the most formal provisions in the Constitution. The Framers apparently feared that factions would attempt to depart from the constitutional method for passing laws and therefore they spelled out that method in one of the document’s longest provisions. The clause describes the specifics of the lawmaking process, including that the President’s veto can be overridden by two-thirds of both Houses, that the President has ten days to decide whether to veto a bill, and that congressional adjournments should not deprive the President of his ability to veto measures. The Framers even mentioned that Sundays should not be counted in the ten-day period, and James Madison had the phrase “after it shall have been presented to him” inserted into the clause to “prevent a question whether the day on which the bill be presented, ought to be counted or not as one of the ten days.” Moreover, to preclude Congress from bypassing the President by calling a bill by another name, Madison also persuaded the Convention to take the extraordinary step of adding a second Presentment Clause that required submission to the President of “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary.” (See Article I, Section 7, Clause 3.) Clearly, the Framers believed that lawmaking was so important that they could not take any chances that the Congress might try to circumvent the President’s role in the legislative process.

There are two ways that the Presentment Clause might be violated. First, Congress might pass statutes that authorize the legislative Houses or the President to take legislative-type actions without conforming to bicameralism and presentment. Second, Congress or the President might take legislative-type actions on their own initiative without statutory authority. The Framers’ efforts have largely proved successful in preventing this second type of Presentment Clause violation. Thus, Congress has rarely if ever attempted to pass laws without either the approval of both Houses or presentment to the President. In addition, the President’s assertions of the constitutional authority to take legislative-type actions in the domestic sphere have been relatively rare and, when they do occur, have often been restrained by the courts. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952); but see In re Debs (1895).

The Constitution has been less successful, however, in preventing Congress from authorizing departures from bicameralism and presentment through the enactment of legislation, such as through statutory delegations of administrative discretion to the executive. These statutes raise complex questions and therefore may sometimes be constitutional. Still, as a general matter, it seems unlikely that the Framers would have allowed Congress to bypass the bicameralism and presentment requirements simply by passing legislation.

One important statutory departure from the traditional lawmaking process was the legislative veto, in which Congress usually granted each house the authority to nullify administrative actions taken by the executive. One might view the legislative veto from several different perspectives, but in each case the veto is unconstitutional. If the legislative veto is conceptualized as executive power, then it is unconstitutional because the legislators who wield it are not executive officials. If the veto is viewed as involving the power to pass legislation, then it clearly violates the Presentment Clause, because the veto does not conform to the requirements of bicameralism or presentment. Finally, the veto might be viewed as an exercise of the power of an individual House, but such powers are either mentioned in the Constitution, such as the power of each House to pass legislative rules, or can be reasonably inferred because they are traditionally possessed by legislative Houses, as with the power of investigation. The legislative veto, however, falls under neither category. The Supreme Court has largely conformed to the Constitution’s original meaning and held legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional. I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise (1991).

The most common departure from bicameralism and presentment has involved the statutory delegation to the executive of administrative discretion. Although such delegations certainly do not conform to the Presentment Clause, there is a plausible originalist argument that these delegations are constitutional either under the Necessary and Proper Clause or because they confer executive power rather than legislative power. Nonetheless, many originalists reject these arguments and conclude that broad delegations are constitutionally problematic because they give to the executive either legislative or nonexecutive power. The Supreme Court, however, currently holds that these delegations are constitutional, based in part on the nonoriginalist argument that the modern administrative state requires them. Mistretta v. United States (1989).

Recently, the Supreme Court has reviewed a different departure from the traditional lawmaking process—the conferral of cancellation authority on the executive—and held it to be unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment Clause. Clinton v. City of New York (1998). In 1995, Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act, which despite its name, did not provide the President with veto authority, but instead authorized him to cancel certain spending provisions. This cancellation authority was similar to an ordinary delegation of administrative authority in that it conferred discretion on the executive, subject to a statutory standard, to take certain actions. Cancellation authority, however, differs from an ordinary delegation since it is generally narrower. Whereas an ordinary delegation allows the executive to promulgate a rule of his choosing, cancellation authority permits him only to accept or reject a statutory rule. For example, in the appropriation law area, ordinary delegations under traditional appropriation laws permit the President to spend any sum between the amount appropriated and zero, whereas cancellation authority only permits him the choice to spend the appropriated amount or to cancel the appropriation and spend nothing.

Reviewing the cancellation authority provided by the Line Item Veto Act, the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional. In the Court’s view, cancellation authority was similar to the power to repeal a law, because the authority could eliminate an appropriation. The exercise of cancellation authority therefore needed to conform to the Presentment Clause. Of course, if cancellation authority is similar to repealing an appropriation, then the executive’s authority under a traditional appropriation to decide how much to spend is similar to enacting an appropriation, because the executive can “legislate” the amount that should be spent. Under the Court’s reasoning, then, ordinary delegations may also logically violate the Presentment Clause, but the Court continues regularly to permit such delegations. The Court has yet to resolve this double standard whereby cancellation authority is unconstitutional even though such authority is generally narrower than ordinary delegations.

Several other matters raise questions under the Presentment Clause. First, some have argued that the clause defines bill as a provision relating to a single subject; consequently, if Congress were to combine two separate subjects in a measure, that would really be two bills and the President could therefore exercise a kind of item veto by vetoing one of the bills, while approving the other. Historical and structural evidence reveals, however, that the original meaning of bill was a measure that included whatever provisions Congress placed within it. Second, the Line Item Veto Act provided that the President would receive cancellation authority only as to bills that he signed but that he would lack such authority if he vetoed the bill, a provision that arguably places an unconstitutional burden on the President’s veto power. Finally, it has been argued that the Presentment Clause requires that Congress pass bills under a majority voting rule, but the clause’s language, which simply refers to every bill “which shall have passed” the legislative houses, combined with its structure and history, indicates that each house can employ supermajority rules to govern the passage of bills.

Michael B. Rappaport is Professor of Law at the University of San Diego, where he also serves as the Director of the Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism .

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ConLawNOW is an online legal journal published by the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron School of Law. It offers a venue for legal analysis of current issues of constitutional law happening now. The new short essay format adopted in 2015 provides debate and analysis of legal issues in the headlines including pending Supreme Court cases, and events as they happen. ConLawNOW offers a quick turn-around time for publication designed to get authors’ insights into the public discourse where they can influence the debate. The journal is peer-reviewed and student edited.

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